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Summary 
COMMERCIAL IMPORTS of dairy products into sub-Saharan Africa increased sixfold over the 
last decade, reaching US$ 707 million net in 1981 in addition to US$ 140 million worth of dairy 
products received as food aid. The subcontinent now imports roughly 30% of its total milk 
consumption. These imports are not evenly distributed: West and central Africa import 46% and 
57% of their needs respectively while East Africa imports 13%. 
This paper describes the development of African dairy imports and highlights the factors that 
have caused their recent tremendous increase. The role of national policies with their objectives 
and instruments, and possible effects, are discussed and the paper gives a brief assessment of 
how further research may help solve some of the problems that have arisen. 
It is obvious that some countries have an alarming dependence on dairy imports, particularly in 
the form of food aid. No single reason is readily apparent but, in some countries, national 
policies have been to blame. In many countries, dairy imports are likely to discourage domestic 
milk production, particularly where there is direct competition between the production of re-
constituted milk from imported milk powder and butter oil, and the local production of fresh milk. 
However, in the absence of data on milk prices and reliable production statistics, no firm 
conclusions can be reached for the subcontinent. In-depth studies of individual countries and 
the effects of their governments' policies for the dairy sector are recommended. 
Introduction 
The fact that imports exist in sub-Saharan Africa should not in itself be a source of unease. 
Economic theory provides some clear arguments to show that external trade policies based on 
the principle of comparative advantage can enhance human welfare in a country, even if 
substantial imports of certain products occur. However, there tends to be more concern over 
imports of basic foodstuffs. Governments hesitate to expose their countries to the uncertainties 
of highly volatile international markets in basic products, particularly foodstuffs, whose supply 
can affect political stability. Moreover, imports have to be offset by equivalent exports to 
maintain a balance of foreign exchange. If a country faces an increasing dependence on 
imported food at a time of acute or latent shortage of foreign exchange, then imports may pose 
severe problems. 
Over the last decade there has been a tremendous increase in dairy imports into sub-Saharan 
Africa and, in most of the countries concerned, there has also been a chronic shortage of 
foreign exchange. Given the importance of dairy products, both for human consumption and as 
a source of farm income, it is vital to study the causes and effects of this development. There is 
a considerable amount of published literature on the theory of international trade and food policy 
(see for example Heidhues, 1979; Oyejide, 1983) and there have been several studies of the 
related problem of cereal imports and policy reactions (McIntire, 1981; Morrison, 1984; 
Huddleston, 1984). However, there has been no published study of dairy imports into sub-
Saharan Africa (see also Eicher and Baker, 1982). This article attempts to correct this 
deficiency. 
Increases in dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa 
Background 
Commercial imports of dairy products into sub-Saharan Africa have increased steadily since 
1960. According to FAO Trade Yearbooks they rose in value from US$ 43 million in 1960 to 
US$ 113 million in 1970 and then to US$ 680 million in 1980. The increase continued in 
1981(US$ 707 million) but appears to have come to a halt in 1982 and 1983 (Figure 1). In 1980, 
sub-Saharan African countries spent approximately 5% of their total revenues from agricultural, 
forestry and fishery exports on imports of dairy products. Dried and condensed milk made up 
two thirds of the total dairy imports in 1960 but accounted for almost 90% from 1970 to 1983. 
This indicates that there has been a shift from imports of items such as cream, yoghurt and 
cheese, to imports of the more basic dairy products. 
Figure 1. Value of net dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa, 1972–82. 
 
Non-commercial imports 
Before the commercial import figures are broken down into regional groupings and countries, 
the role of non-commercial imports of dairy products, in the form of food aid, must be 
mentioned. The major items of food aid are skimmed milk powder and butter oil which can be 
recombined to form liquid milk. In 1981, sub-Saharan African countries received as food aid a 
total of about 88 000 t of dried skimmed milk, and 9000 t each of butter oil and other dairy 
products (FAO, 1984). This is equal to almost 770 000 t of liquid milk equivalent (LME)1. These 
imports are provided free of charge by the donor, although the recipient country sometimes has 
to contribute to shipping and/or distribution costs. Valued at current prices of commercial 
imports (c.i.f.)2, dairy food aid to sub-Saharan Africa in 1981 was equivalent to almost US$ 140 
million, or 16% of the total value of all dairy imports (Figure 1)3. 
  
1.    For the conversion of dairy products into milk equivalents, see FAO (1978a). 
2.    The c.i.f. import price is inclusive of the cost of insurance and freight. 
3.    Butter oil has been valued at 1.2 times the import (c.i.f.) price for butter according to the 
price ratio set for the GATT minimum prices (GATT, 1983). 'Other dairy products' have been 
valued as equivalent to the price of condensed milk. A weighted regional average has been 
used for those countries and commodities where no price for commercial imports for the year in 
question is available.  
  
Detailed statistics on food aid are available for the period 1977 to 1981, when food aid 
increased in volume by almost 140% in LME against an increase of 43% for commercial 
imports. On average the share of food aid in total dairy imports (in LME) rose from 17% in 1977 
to 25% in 1981 and 23% in 1982. Both the quantities of dairy products imported commercially 
and as food aid have to be considered when the effects of imports on domestic prices, 
production and consumption are analysed. However, since food aid can be given in various 
ways, e.g. with special conditions attached to its use or as a direct contribution to domestic 
supplies, the precise effects of each type of donation have to be carefully analysed for each 
country. 
Dairy import statistics by region 
It would be of interest to study dairy imports by ecological zones, but this is not possible given 
the form of the available data. Instead, all sub-Saharan African countries have been grouped 
into four regions i.e. West, central, East and southern Africa. As can be seen in Figure 2, West 
African countries are responsible for most (about 55 to 60%) commercial imports. The other 
three regions share the remaining 40% more or less equally, although East Africa increased its 
share from about 5% to 20% in the last decade. There is a different regional pattern for food aid. 
East Africa receives almost 50% of all food aid deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 3), while 
the share of West Africa fluctuates between 25 and 33% of the total. 
Figure 2. Commercial dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa by region. 
  
Source: FAO Trade Yearbooks (various years). 
Figure 3. Dairy food aid imports into sub-Saharan Africa by region. 
  
Source: FAO, 1984. 
Further information can be obtained by comparing regional dairy imports per caput. As can be 
seen from Table 1, only in southern Africa was the volume of commercial dairy imports per 
caput more or less stable from 1972 to 1982. East Africa showed the biggest increase in 
commercial imports per caput, from 0.62 kg/head for 1972 to 3.87 kg/head for 1982. Combined 
food aid and commercial dairy imports per caput increased by 104% from 1977 to 1982 in East 
Africa. With 8.77 kg/head in 1982, West Africa imports most dairy products per caput. 
  
Table 1. Net dairy imports per caput by the regions of sub-Saharan Africa, 1972, 1977 and 
1982. 
Year Type of Imports 
Net dairy imports (kg LME/caput) 
West Africa 
Central 
Africa 
East Africa 
Southern 
Africa 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
1972 
Commercial 4.12 2.71 0.62 5.25 3.00 
Food aid n.a.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1977 
Commercial 7.59 3.18 1.70 5.91 4.91 
Food aid 0.71 0.81 1.60 0.82 1.00 
Total 8.30 3.99 3.30 6.73 5.91 
1982 
Commercial 7.78 4.29 3.87 5.52 5.78 
Food aid 0.99 1.36 2.86 2.36 1.77 
Total 8.77 5.65 6.73 7.88 7.55 
1n.a. = not available. 
Sources: Calculations based on FAO Trade Yearbooks (various years), FAO (1978a); FAO 
(1984) and World Bank (1983). 
The dependence on commercial dairy imports and food aid is best illustrated by comparison 
with total milk consumption i.e. total domestic milk production plus total dairy imports. Although 
in general milk production data for African countries are not very reliable, changes in import 
consumption ratios may be used, if interpreted cautiously. These are presented in Table 2 for 
1971–73 and 1981–83. 
Table 2. Contribution of commercial, food aid and total imports of dairy products to total milk 
consumption for the regions of sub-Saharan Africa, 1971–73 and 1981–83. 
Period Type of Imports 
Dairy imports/milk consumption 
West Africa 
Central 
Africa 
East Africa 
Southern 
Africa 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
1971–73 
Commercial 0.26 0.33 0.01 0.23 0.11 
Food aid n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1981–83 
Commercial 0.41 0.39 0.07 0.25 0.21 
Food aid 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.06 
Total 0.46 0.52 0.13 0.35 0.27 
Note: Consumption is calculated as all liquid milk production plus total imports. All figures are 
the respective 3-year averages. 
Sources: Calculations based on FAO Production Yearbooks, FAO Trade Yearbooks, FAO 
(1978a) and FAO (1984). 
The overall dependence on dairy imports was highest in West and central Africa, where imports 
comprised about 50% of total consumption. In East Africa local milk producers provide most of 
the dairy products consumed, but the increase in the ratio between commercial imports and 
consumption between 1972 and 1982 was as large for East Africa as for West Africa. 
Furthermore, East African countries are more dependent on food aid. In two thirds of East 
African countries food aid accounted for 40% or more of total dairy imports in 1982, whereas in 
other regions less than two fifths of countries fall into this category. Five out of the 45 sub-
Saharan African countries depend on food aid for more than 50% of their total dairy imports. 
Share of total dairy imports in total consumption 
When the food needs, incomes and dairy imports of African countries are examined more 
closely, three broad groupings can be discerned. 
There are nine countries (Benin, Congo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Togo and Zaire) with less than 20 kg milk consumption per caput that import more than 60% of 
their requirements. These countries are highly dependent on dairy imports. However, with the 
exception of Ghana and Sierra Leone, all meet at least 90% of the total calorie requirement of 
their populations (World Bank, 1983). Dairy imports do not, therefore, appear to play a crucial 
role in overall human nutrition in these countries. Ghana and Sierra Leone, with lower nutritional 
levels, are not only dependent on dairy imports but more than 30% of these imports are in the 
form of food aid. Benin (in common with Central African Republic, Lesotho and Somalia) shows 
the atypical feature of a high share of dairy food aid in total milk consumption. For the majority 
of all countries the proportion of dairy food aid decreases with a rising share of total dairy 
imports in total consumption. 
Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Nigeria are highly import-dependent yet have a relatively low 
per caput consumption. However, all these countries have comparatively high average incomes, 
i.e. their GNP per caput exceeds US$ 400. Most dairy imports are purchased rather than 
received as food aid. 
The third group comprises nine countries—Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, 
Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda. Each of these countries has a GNP per caput of less than US$ 
300 and receives more than 30% of all dairy imports as food aid. In all of these countries, with 
the exception of Somalia, more than 80% of the population lives in rural areas. 
It is clear that sub-Saharan Africa cannot easily, or quickly, meet its demand for milk from 
domestic supplies. 
Some potential influences 
Population growth 
The human population of sub-Saharan Africa increased annually by an average of 2.9% from 
1970 to 1980 (World Bank, 1981). With all other factors remaining constant, and assuming no 
changes in demand caused by changes in age distribution, demand for milk would have 
increased at the same rate. However, commercial dairy imports (in LME) into sub-Saharan 
Africa increased by an annual average of 9.9% over the same period, indicating that factors 
other than population must have been influential. 
Urbanisation 
Rapid urbanisation is widely assumed to boost the demand for imports of all food products. The 
mechanism behind this is the change of status from one of rural subsistence to that of the urban 
dweller whose milk demand, given the present stage of agricultural development and 
infrastructure in many sub-Saharan African countries, cannot be met by domestic supply. In 
other words, people move to the cities but their milk source does not, The World Bank (1981) 
reports that urban populations in sub-Saharan Africa have increased overall by 6% a year, and 
by 8.5% a year for 35 major capitals. However, there is no formula available to translate this 
growth into a growth of demand for dairy imports. 
Income 
Incomes in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa increased by an average of 0.8% over the last 
10 years (World Bank, 1981). It can be assumed that part or all of this additional income was 
spent on food, and on milk products in particular. The increase in demand for milk due to rising 
incomes can be estimated from the income elasticity of quantitative demand for milk which was 
calculated to be 0.68 for sub-Saharan Africa in the mid-1970s (FAO, 1978b). This means that 
the demand for milk increases at about two-thirds the rate of the increase in total income. Solely 
in terms of the income elasticity of demand, an annual growth rate in demand for milk of about 
0.54% could thus be expected. However, there are several complicating factors because a 
population is composed of individuals, not averages. High-income consumers differ from those 
on a low income, just as urban consumers differ from rural, and consumer preferences can 
change over time. However, the figure does give an indication of the relationship between 
income and demand for dairy products. 
Consumer prices 
The effect of price changes on the demand for milk is well defined by economic theory. Rising 
prices for milk will, under normal circumstances, lead to a decrease in demand and vice 
versa. The extent of the change is determined by the price elasticity of quantitative demand. 
Cross price elasticities, which indicate the effects of changes in the prices of commodities that 
are complementary to or substitutes for milk, can also be defined. However, in practice there are 
several problems. 
Milk can hardly be considered a homogeneous product. Qualitative differences with regard to fat 
content, purity and, above all, freshness and taste, may well lead to substantial price 
differences. In many countries reconstituted milk (from milk powder and butter oil) cannot 
compete at the same price as fresh milk. In many countries the marketing channels are very 
diverse. Often petty traders compete with cooperatives and/or parastatals, and each tends to 
provide different services to the consumers. Thus, differences in both the level of service and 
the quality of milk can have an important influence on price structures. 
A special problem is the role of rural producer-consumers. In a system where a significant, if not 
dominant, share of the milk produced is used for the farmer's own subsistence, it is sometimes 
hard to determine what his reaction to changing prices will be. The ratio between milk and 
cereal prices plays an important role in this respect. Again, very little is known about the size, or 
even the sign (positive or negative), of the cross price elasticity. 
Producer prices 
Many of the points raised above also apply to producer prices. Again, the economic parameters 
describing the reaction of subsistence producers are either unknown or incomplete. Even 
overall estimates of aggregate price elasticities of milk supply are rarely available. There have 
been efforts to identify the effects of several non-price factors influencing milk supply, and to 
establish some causal links (McClintock, 1984). However, the results are not encouraging, and 
only guesses can be made about what caused the decline in African milk production per caput 
of 0.4% per year over the last decade (see Anteneh, 1984). There is a widespread opinion that 
milk producers respond significantly to rising prices. With regard to the 'direction' of the effects, 
economic theory predicts that milk supply will probably increase when the price-cost ratio for 
dairy production compares favourably with other production alternatives. More detailed case 
studies may allow us to draw further conclusions. Unsatisfying as this may be, it is maintained 
here that the price mechanism plays a crucial role in determining both the demand for, and the 
supply of, milk. 
Foreign exchange 
The availability of foreign currency to pay for imports is one of the factors that influences imports 
most directly. In the last decade, balance-of-payment deficits have increased in most sub-
Saharan African countries (World Bank, 1981), and this should have curbed rather than 
stimulated dairy imports. However, many African countries have resorted to market interference, 
and to controls on exchange rate and currency. Government policy has a decisive influence in 
this area, but for many countries the limit for expenditures on dairy imports does not yet seem to 
have been reached. 
Food aid 
There are two ways in which dairy food aid influences total dairy imports. First, the decision to 
supply food aid to a particular country is not influenced by the market price for milk in that 
country; in this respect the availability of food aid must be considered an independent variable. 
Second, an offer of food aid may well change a country's demand for commercial imports by 
either complementing them or partly substituting for them. 
Only general remarks can be made about the factors which influence the availability of dairy 
food aid. The EC, the most important donor to African countries, has since 1979 operated within 
an annual target of 150 000 t of skimmed milk powder and 45 000 t of butter oil. This is 
allocated to various developing countries and aid organisations or to the FAO World Food 
Programme (CEC, 1983). There are various forms of dairy food aid. The most frequent are 
'food-for-work' programmes, dairy development projects and unconditional or 'emergency' 
shipments. In all cases the recipient country has to 'apply' for food aid in that a political 
agreement or contract is required. 
No statistics are available to show the relative importance of these different forms of dairy food 
aid to sub-Saharan African countries. The World Food Programme is committed to dairy 
projects in nine African countries (FAO/WFP, 1983) but other organisations also cover dairy 
development, e.g. the EC donations to Mali. Figure 1 shows that the share of food aid in sub-
Saharan Africa's total dairy imports increased from 7% in 1977 to 25% in 1981. The present 
dependence of individual countries has already been described. It is hard to foresee whether 
the EC's expressed intention to cut back on dairy food aid (The Economist, 1984) will stimulate 
commercial imports or reduce consumption. There may even be a rise in African milk production 
with the removal of the disincentive effect sometimes ascribed to food aid. 
International prices 
Relative price differences between individual countries, when translated into absolute price 
differences (by the exchange rate), are the driving force behind international trade. Relative 
price differences are due to differing patterns of demand and supply and are relatively constant. 
When many countries trade in a commodity, countries trading in small quantities have little 
influence on the world market price that emerges. This lack of influence of 'small' countries 
certainly applies to sub-Saharan African countries and their role in the world markets for milk 
products. Assuming no government interference and ample foreign exchange, the ratio between 
domestic and international prices determines the amount of net imports, ensuring the balance 
between supply and demand and adjusting domestic prices towards world market levels. 
Two amendments to this basic mechanism must be made. First, milk and dairy products are 
traded mainly in processed forms. With milk the processing charges must be taken into account, 
unlike wheat for which one can directly compare the import (c.i.f.) prices and the price on the 
domestic market adjusted for transport costs, storage etc. Although fresh milk is the major 
domestic dairy product it is rarely traded internationally, and so any comparison of international 
and domestic prices has to use recombined milk as a substitute. The following example may 
illustrate the case: skimmed milk powder at a price (c.i.f.) of US$ 1000/t and butter oil at US$ 
2500/t can be recombined with water in the proportions of 10% skimmed milk powder, 3.5% 
butter oil and 86.5% water. Allowing for a processing cost of 10%, the equivalent 'border' price 
for recombined milk is US$ 0.21/litre. Translated into domestic currency at the current exchange 
rate and adjusted for transport costs etc., this border price, when compared with domestic 
prices, determines whether imports will flow in or not. A further complication is that consumers 
usually recognize a quality difference in favour of fresh milk, and this means that the domestic 
price for fresh milk can be somewhat higher than the border price of recombined milk, and still 
remain competitive. 
The second amendment to the general theory concerns the effect of government policy. Often 
heavily distorted exchange rates, import duties, import monopolies and other regulations 
interfere with the free market assumed in the above example. Because of this interference, any 
interpretation of the international to domestic price ratio must be adjusted to allow for these 
policy distortions. 
Increases in dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa are thus caused by a variety of factors. 
Population growth, urbanisation, income and consumer prices are potential influences on the 
demand side. The effects of changes in producer prices are probably the main influence on the 
supply side. Foreign exchange, food aid and international prices also have major direct effects 
on dairy imports. 
The effect of these various influences can be summarised as follows. On the demand side, all 
factors contribute to rising imports to differing degrees. With regard to prices, both on the 
demand and supply sides, more analysis is needed in order to judge better their causes and 
effects. In many African countries prices have been depressed by government policies, and this 
would further increase the demand for imports. Foreign exchange limitations do not seem to 
have slowed the increase in total dairy imports, whereas availability of food aid and depressed 
international prices for dairy products appear to have contributed to the increase. Although 
varying widely, government policies will have influenced all of these factors and could even 
have changed the direction of their impact. Some evidence about the potential role of 
governments in the development of dairy imports in the last decade is given below. 
On a sub-continental scale there are few data to quantify the factors influencing international 
markets. However, an auxiliary calculation, which includes some trend values to allow for 
different reasons for growth in commercial dairy imports, is given below. Population growth and 
rising incomes are taken as exogenous factors. No empirical data are available for price 
changes, government policies and other factors such as shifts in consumer preferences. Thus, 
the total change in dairy imports (ΔM) is explained below by a term for changes in population 
(ΔN) plus a term for changes in disposable income per caput (ΔY) minus a term for changes in 
domestic milk production (ΔQ) plus a residual term (e) comprising all other factors. 
The resulting equation is 
 
The influence of the single factors is weighted by the rate of self-sufficiency (RSS) which is the 
share of domestic supply in total dairy consumption. Changes in per caput incomes are 
multiplied by the coefficient of their assumed influence on dairy demand, i.e. the income 
elasticity of milk demand (η). Table 3 gives results of the calculations for countries listed in order 
of the magnitude of the residual term. The higher a country ranks in Table 3, the greater are the 
influences of 'other factors' (i.e. other than population, income and changes in domestic 
production) on dairy imports. 
Table 3. Indicators of potential policy influence on dairy imports in 29 countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Country Regiona 
Ecological 
zoneb 
Average 
annual 
growth in 
importsc 
(%) 
Share of food 
aid in total 
importsd 
(%) 
Average 
annual 
growth in per 
caput 
consumptione 
(%) 
Residual 
termf 
Zambia S SH/SA –15.0* 0.32 –10.3* +19.2* 
Sierra Leone W H/SH +10.2 0.35 + 9.3* +10.0* 
Ivory Coast W H/SH +14.4 0.01 + 8.7 + 7.6 
Somalia E A/– +80.5* 0.49 –14.0* + 6.4* 
Congo C H/SH + 8.9 0.08 + 9.8* + 5.4* 
Togo W SH/H +12.9 0.18 + 5.9 + 4.6 
Nigeria W SH/SA +15.4 0.01 + 6.3 + 4.5 
Liberia W H/– + 6.5 0.10 + 3.3 + 3.2 
Niger W A/– –0.7 0.25 + 3.2* + 3.0* 
Mauritania W A/– + 5.5 0.35 + 1.5 + 2.3 
Uganda E SH/H –1.6 0.43 –0.9 + 2.2 
Malawi S SH/SA + 1.5 0.41 + 2.8 + 1.6 
Cent. Afr. Rep. C H/SH + 3.0 0.30 + 2.0 + 1.6 
Burundi C HL/SH +35.0 0.40 + 2.8 + 0.4 
Upper Volta W SA/SH +36.2 0.36 + 8.0 + 0.3 
Benin W SH/SA +12.2 0.39 + 1.7 + 0.2 
Ethiopia E A/HL +21.3 0.40 –0.2 –0.2 
Senegal W SA/A + 5.7 0.19 –0.4 –0.3 
Mali W A/SA –0.1 0.32 + 1.2 –0.3 
Lesotho S n.a. +10.1 0.51 + 3.3 –1.2 
Guinea W SH/H + 3.2 0.24 –2.5 –2.7 
Ghana W H/SH –2.9 0.30 –5.4 –3.4 
Rwanda C HL/SH –3.2 0.95 –2.8 –4.3 
Madagascar S SH/H –5.6 0.31 –5.4 –4.3 
Cameroon C H/SH + 8.5 0.17 –1.0 –4.6 
Zimbabwe S SA/SH +47.2 0.32 –5.6 –5.1 
Sudan E A/SA + 18.8 0.40 –6.9* –8.1 
Zaire C H/SH –4.2 0.16 –9.2* –8.5 
Tanzania E SH/SA + 0.4 0.51 –8.6* –10.1* 
* Figures marked thus are considered particularly unreliable. 
a C = central, S = southern, E = East and W = West Africa. 
b SH = subhumid, H = humid, SA = semi-arid, A = arid, HL = highlands (see Jahnke,1982, p. 
233). 
c Commercial dairy imports only, from 1972–74 (av.) to 1980–82 (av). 
d Average of 1980–82 figures. 
e Consumption = domestic production + commercial imports, for the same period as under note 
c. 
f The residual term is the term 'e' in Equation 1; period as for note c. 
Sources: FAO Production Yearbooks, FAO Trade Yearbooks, FAO (1978a; 1984) and World 
Bank (1981; 1983). 
For example, Nigeria ranks in the upper quarter of Table 3. Commercial dairy imports into 
Nigeria grew by an average of 15.4% annually even without food aid. Per caput milk 
consumption increased by 6.3% per year, mainly due to the increase in imports. The residual 
term of +4.5 indicates that population, income and milk production growth in Nigeria account for 
only a 10.9% increase in dairy imports. The remaining increase of 4.5% must be due to pricing 
policy, exchange rate controls, or long-term shifts in demand e.g. substitution of sheep and goat 
milk for cow's milk. In Cameroon the figures suggest that commercial imports of dairy products 
would have increased by another 4.6% annually if policy and other factors had not curbed their 
growth. Per caput consumption declined by 1.0% on average. 
Table 3 shows that in 25 out of the 29 countries listed the change in per caput milk 
consumption, whether positive or negative, was in accordance with the sign of the residual term 
(e). In two thirds of the countries, growth in imports matched a growth in per caput consumption. 
The importance of dairy imports for consumption, and of national policies for the development of 
dairy imports, is underlined by these results. 
Some possible effects of increased dairy imports 
The complex interactions between prices, demand and supply in domestic and world markets 
make it difficult to distinguish causes and effects. On the demand side, population, income 
growth and urbanisation can be taken as independent variables (although the availability of 
cheap imported foodstuffs may itself have stimulated migration to the cities). In general, 
increases in dairy imports have increased the total supply of milk and dairy products in importing 
countries, thereby halting, or even reversing, upward trends in prices. Consumers in general 
have benefited from this effect. 
Declining producer prices 
In the face of declining or stagnant prices, producers can be expected to cut back on dairy 
production and shift their resources to the production of more profitable items. However, many 
producers may stay in milk production simply because they have no production alternatives. 
Similarly, it could be argued that technical innovations, e .g. improvements in management and 
breeding stocks, would lower production costs and offset the effect of decreasing dairy prices. In 
Europe, for example, the EC reports an annual average increase in milk yield per cow of 2.2% 
since 1974, and 3.8% for 1981/82, which is claimed to reflect improved herd structure and 
quality of milk cows (CEC, 1984). For sub-Saharan Africa, however, virtually no increase in 
average yield was observed over the last decade, either per productive animal or per total herd. 
The only regional exception was West Africa which showed a modest improvement in dairy 
production (Anteneh, 1984). 
Unfortunately, the availability and quality of price statistics are very poor for most African 
countries. It is therefore impossible to quantify, on a sub-Saharan or regional scale, the impact 
of dairy imports on domestic price levels and production. There have been cases where local 
milk processing plants have stopped collecting fresh milk because they found it more economic 
to sell reconstituted milk from cheap milk powder and butter oil imports4. There may be a circular 
effect, with imports depressing local production and this generating even greater demand for 
imports. Such an effect will approach an equilibrium if prices are not fixed. 
4.    The dangers of dairy imports are discussed, for example, by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Tanzania (1977). 
Balance of payments 
The level of dairy imports is directly affected by the availability of foreign exchange and 
variations in the exchange rate. At the same time, growing expenditure on dairy imports poses 
an additional burden on a country's balance of payments and tends to weaken its currency. The 
total impact on the economy is not easily quantified, but one can compare the value of net 
imports of dairy products with total export revenues to get an indication of the burden placed on 
the balance of payments. It becomes obvious that there are great variations among the 
countries for which data are available. In those five countries (Burkina Faso, Benin, Mauritania, 
Senegal and Somalia) that spend a relatively large percentage of total export earnings on dairy 
imports (5% or more) it is possible that imports have displaced expenditures on long-term 
development projects. 
The role of national policies 
It is generally accepted that national policies play a critical role in livestock development (World 
Bank, 1981). Not only do they modify the overall economic environment for agricultural 
production, but they often interfere directly with the production processes, marketing channels, 
and consumption, as well as with external trade. 
The use of the word 'policy' requires some explanation. In many cases it is necessary to 
distinguish between deliberate policies for which governments design effective instruments, and 
policies which governments publicly espouse but which they know will not be effective. Another 
distinction needs to be made between policies which are clearly defined and targeted to dairy 
imports, consumption or production, and other policies, such us the setting of the exchange 
rate, which are not specially directed towards dairy imports but which may have indirect effects 
on them. Finally, there is the distinction between policies which are consistent in their effects 
and those which are not, regardless of the government's original intention. A government may 
make decisions in two areas which then have a perfectly consistent though unintended 
influence on a related third area. Consider, for example, a government that devalues its 
currency in order to comply with IMF or IDA credit requirements, and decides to impose a duty 
on beef exports to increase its tax revenues. By curbing imports and reducing the profitability of 
beef production the government produces a consistent policy that also stimulates dairy 
production. 
Objectives of government interference 
As Bates (1983) puts it: "Bluntly, food policy appears to represent a form of political 
settlement—one designed to bring peaceful relations between African governments and their 
urban constituents". If true, this attitude is in marked contrast to that in most developed 
countries, especially in the EC, where the overall objective has usually been to support 
agricultural incomes (Heidhues, 1979). 
For African countries it seems appropriate to assume that agricultural policies favour the 
consumer rather than the producers5. What are the possible objectives behind such policies? 
Three types of objectives can be mentioned: governments aim to survive; they also have 
general objectives in the area of food policy; and they may have certain, specific objectives 
relating to dairy imports. 
5.    Nevertheless, careful examination of existing policies is required, as can be seen, 
for example, from von Braun and de Haen (1983) who showed that agricultural policy in 
Egypt was much less at the cost of agriculture than was generally expected. 
Food policy is often crucial to government aims because it has direct effects on the population 
and their goodwill. Therefore, the objectives of food policy, whether to secure food supply, to 
increase self-sufficiency or to support special groups like city dwellers, are often closely related 
to government self-interest. 
Not all policy objectives are necessarily consistent with each other: they may also be in conflict. 
Often one objective can only be reached at the expense of others. To try and provide both 
attractive farm incomes and low food prices—without imposing huge costs on the national 
budget— is a common example of one objective being sacrificed for the sake of others. 
In the field of dairy import policy six common objectives may be distinguished: to meet certain 
milk consumption targets; to generate tariff revenues; to protect producers against world market 
competition; to save foreign exchange; to stimulate domestic dairy development; and to realize 
the benefits of free trade. The starting point for the following descriptions relate to a country that 
is a net importer of dairy products and whose government has no policy on such imports. 
The milk consumption objective 
Any increase in milk consumption in a poor country could substantially improve overall nutrition, 
whether it be that of vulnerable groups like children or pregnant women or that of the whole 
population. A government wanting to increase milk consumption will have to do so by way of 
increased imports if domestic production is insufficient or if market links between producers and 
consumers are weak. The major instruments used to stimulate imports are a reduction in tariffs, 
import subsidies and (subsidised) state trading and distribution. Alternatively, the government 
can request food aid. Depending on the instruments used there will be some burden on the 
national budget. 
The tariff revenue objective 
If dairy imports already exist, the government can try to make them contribute to the national 
budget. By imposing an import tariff this will create the desired revenue at the expense of the 
consumers and/or the external suppliers. Since budgetary considerations are the major force 
behind such a policy, the economic effects on consumers and producers are given lower 
priority. There may be a contradiction, and consequent trade-offs, between this objective and a 
policy that sets consumption targets. 
The protection objective 
Tariffs to raise tax revenues increase domestic prices over world market prices, and thereby 
favour domestic production over imports. The same protective wall around local producers can 
also be erected by introducing quantitative restrictions, i.e. import quotas, or other non-tariff 
barriers such as quality requirements, port procedures and fees. In any case, the successful 
protection of domestic milk producers imposes a burden on consumers, either through higher 
consumer prices or through increased taxes that are needed to finance additional government 
compensation. The protection objective is not compatible with any objective that seeks 
increased consumer welfare. 
The foreign exchange objective 
A government's effort to save foreign exchange has similar effects. Dairy imports, unless they 
are in the form of food aid or can be paid for in local currency, can be reduced by the same 
instruments as those used to pursue the protection objective. The primary effects are the same. 
However, the secondary effects need to be analysed to see whether or not the stimulus to milk 
production increases the demand for foreign inputs and thus affects the foreign exchange 
balance. In some situations trade-offs occur between the protection and the foreign exchange 
and/or the tariff revenue objectives, although some of the instruments used may at first glance 
appear to serve all three objectives. 
The dairy development objective 
It may not be immediately clear how a government can develop the domestic dairy sector other 
than by reducing imports and increasing domestic prices. However, the dairy development 
objective can be pursued positively by a channelled increase in imports. There are two major 
strategies: the first is based on the assumption that dairy production needs a minimum level of 
marketing channels and processing facilities to get off the ground. Where production is 
scattered and insignificant, dairy imports can help create an infrastructure and stimulate 
demand at the same time. However, many reservations apply and such a policy will usually be 
only a short-term device. The second strategy is based on the same fundamental assumption 
but includes the concept of using revenues from food aid sales for investment. As in the Indian 
'Operation Flood', dairy food aid can be sold locally to generate funds for dairy development. 
The same procedure is possible with controlled commercial imports if the balance between 
domestic supply and demand results in prices above world market levels. It is clear that any 
such dairy development policy incorporates an array of policy instruments, with those affecting 
dairy imports being prominent. 
The free-trade-benefits objective 
In the 'free trade' theory, overall national welfare is considered to be maximised by the 
undistorted allocation of resources according to their economic value as expressed in 
international prices. According to the pure theory, governments should not interfere with dairy 
imports. 
However, there is a role for government policy which does not necessarily conflict with the 
principle of comparative advantage. For example, there may be reasons to offset price 
movements on the international markets that are not true indicators of the supply and demand 
situation, but merely reflections of other countries' protectionist policies. 
The instruments used to balance out these market defects, e.g. anti-dumping tariffs, will be of a 
transient nature. They may be supplemented by quality controls, price monitoring and other 
means to ensure fair competition. The difficulty in such an 'adjusted free trade' policy lies in the 
inherent temptation for governments to lapse into the protectionist stance they originally set out 
to combat. 
The major instruments and their effects 
Import subsidies 
Governments can improve milk consumption through import subsidies which can be targeted or 
non-targeted. A common example of an effort to meet milk consumption requirements of 
specific target groups is that of a school milk programme in which the government subsidises a 
particular group. If the government wants to subsidise milk consumption in general rather than 
that by school children in particular, it can simply subsidise all dairy imports with a fixed amount 
per tonne. However, even if the same amount of total imports is assumed in each case, the 
effects are quite different. 
The general subsidy will decrease domestic prices and thus have a disincentive effect on 
producers, whereas the special subsidy to a target group allows them to buy and consume milk 
that would not otherwise be consumed. The difference between a targeted and untargeted 
import subsidy is that the latter has disincentive effects on domestic production, whereas a 
targeting of import subsidy can avoid disincentives, or at least diminish them. 
A non-targeted subsidy effect can also be brought about by other countries subsidising their 
producers whereby world market prices decline. The implications are the same and, as with 
food aid, the government does not have to pay. This interpretation may well describe what has 
actually happened: depressed world market price levels, basically due to USA and EC dairy 
policies, have fuelled Africa's milk demand and dairy imports, thereby hampering the continent's 
dairy development efforts. 
Import tariff 
In economic terms a tariff has the opposite effects of an import subsidy. The consumers are the 
losers since milk consumption and real disposable income are reduced as a consequence of 
higher prices. However, producers benefit. 
Other aspects of government policy 
Many African governments have attempted to control trade in foodstuffs directly. They 
participate in, or even monopolise, import activities by setting up statal or parastatal 
organisations that often have far-reaching powers. It is hard to generalise about their effects 
since they can intervene in the market in many ways. Statal or parastatal organisations can be 
subsidised as well as taxed, can reap monopoly rents or supply isolated areas with high 
distribution costs at no extra expense. All these activities can substitute, complement or offset 
dairy import policies, and the eventual effects on production, consumption, trade and welfare 
are difficult to assess. 
In general, state trading tends to act against the market forces rather than to reinforce or 
complement them. Frequently, through state trading, governments pursue precisely those 
objectives which the market will not provide for. Keeping consumer prices at an artificially low 
level despite insufficient supply, or limiting imports in a similar situation, are common examples. 
This often means an overall decline in welfare. The answer to the question 'Who gains, who 
loses?' depends on the market situation and on the activity undertaken. The most obvious sign 
of the effects of state trading against the market forces is the existence of 'black', i.e. free, 
markets—a common feature of many African countries. 
Price policy is another important issue but it is too complex to be thoroughly covered here. In 
theory, almost all the listed objectives concerning dairy imports can be reached by setting 
producer or consumer prices. For example, by pushing the domestic milk price below world 
market levels, a government takes away any commercial incentive to import dairy products, and 
thereby saves foreign exchange. Any pricing policy, however, faces the major problem of 
actually controlling administered prices. Sub-Saharan African milk markets in particular, with 
their abundance of informal marketing channels and direct producer-consumer links, are almost 
impossible to control effectively. Both Kenya and Mali, to name but two of many possible 
examples, have at least one milk price with its respective marketing channel in addition to the 
official, controlled market price (FAO, 1981; 1983). 
Some examples of current policies 
Dairy import policies do not often feature in African governments' official statements. This is not 
surprising since they involve details which do not lend themselves to public speeches or election 
promises, and other products may be considered more important. The result is that information 
on specific objectives for dairy imports is rare. 
Thus, statistics on tariffs, trade regulations and marketing patterns are often hard to find; 
however, two approximations that are readily available are the relative importance of imports in 
the domestic dairy sector, and what proportion of these imports is commercial. Both variables 
are relatively high if the country has followed a policy of relatively open borders. The two criteria 
selected to identify a relatively open-border policy are whether the share of imports in total milk 
consumption is over 50%, and whether at least 65% of dairy imports are commercial (Table 4). 
An interesting pattern emerges. Other than the islands in the Indian Ocean, all 18 countries that 
meet these criteria are located along the West and central African coastline. Apart from 
Senegal, none of these countries' dairy imports seem to put a particularly large burden on their 
foreign exchange account. For Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal the World Bank (1983) states that 
they have a high or, in the case of Senegal, a medium distortion of the exchange rate, and this 
may have fuelled dairy imports. 
Table 4. Tentative indicators of an open-border policy with regard to dairy imports for 18 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa, 1980–82. 
  
Dairy imports as % of 
consumption 
Commercial dairy 
imports as % of total 
dairy imports 
Value of dairy imports 
as % of total export 
revenues 
Angola 51 84 2 
Cameroon 51 83 1 
C.A.R. 56 70 1 
Congo 82 92 1 
Gambia 68 75 n. a. 
Ghana 88 70 1 
Guinea Bissau 57 66 n.a. 
Ivory Coast 94 99 3 
Liberia 94 90 1 
Mauritius 77 91 n.a. 
Nigeria 66 99 2 
Reunion 82 99 n.a. 
S. Tome 83 68 n.a. 
Senegal 60 81 5 
Seychelles 83 88 n.a. 
Sierra Leone 69 65 2 
Togo 64 72 1 
Zaire 91 84 3 
Note: All figures are 1980–82 averages. 
Sources: Calculations based on FAO Production Yearbooks, FAO Trade Yearbooks, FAO 
(1984) and World Bank (1983). 
Again, the speculative character of such calculations must be stressed and before any 
conclusions can be reached, national price statistics for dairy products must be available. 
Kenya and Mali are two countries for which some information is available. Each country 
contains two markedly different ecological zones and thus features different milk production 
patterns and supply potentials, i.e. pastoral semi-subsistence and intensive mixed crop–
livestock farming. The following descriptions include the findings of country studies within the 
International Scheme for the Coordination of Dairy Development (ISCDD) (FAO, 1978c; 1981; 
1983). 
Kenya 
Kenya is generally believed to have the potential for meeting domestic milk demand, and 
throughout the 1970s the trade balance in dairy products showed a modest export surplus. The 
government encourages development of regional cooperative dairies to improve market outlets; 
maintains growth of smallholder milk production; aims to improve nutritional levels and to 
provide 'a stimulus to dairy development' with a school milk programme; and promotes a 
change to zero grazing systems in the high-potential areas where more than three quarters of 
all dairy cattle are located (FAO, 1981). 
The trade-off between producer and consumer welfare is alleviated by the government's 
commitment to a school milk programme. The major policy instruments used consist of: setting 
basic prices at the producer and retail levels; providing artificial insemination, animal health and 
other extension services; and running the school milk programme. The Kenyan Ministry of 
Livestock Development (1980) also records the existence of a 50% import duty and a 15% sales 
tax on dairy products which it wants to be removed at times of strong import demand. Beyond 
that, no articulate dairy import policy emerges. 
However, a rapidly increasing demand and the school milk programme led to a milk deficit in 
1979/80; this is likely to persist throughout the 1980s. The policy effect of creating extra demand 
for milk is obvious in this case and has been realized by the government (Kenyan Ministry of 
Livestock Development, 1980). Since 1983, the FAO/ World Food Programme (WFP) has 
provided milk powder and butter oil shipments to support the school milk programme 
(FAO/WFP, 1983). 
One could conclude that the more general measures on the production side, e.g. input 
provision, could not match the effects of government policy on the demand side. The role of 
price setting and the adequacy of the marketing system would need further analysis in this 
respect. The government's reactions, in terms of calling in the WFP and of considering a tax 
reduction for dairy imports, are well-targeted steps in an import policy, but their effects cannot 
yet be observed. The Kenyan example shows how easily a fairly balanced market can be 
disturbed by government interference. It also shows that different periods are needed for policy 
instruments to become effective: stimulating milk production is unlikely to show quick results, 
whereas dairy imports and the consumer tend to react immediately to incentives. 
Mali 
Mali is a country with a low overall potential for intensive milk production. However, the 
economic importance of livestock is substantial (Wilson et al, 1983; FAO, 1978c). To date, milk 
policy has had effects only in the Bamako region, where the country's single milk processing 
plant, Union laitière de Bamako (ULB), is located. This reflects both the government's objective 
to provide the capital with a reasonable supply of milk and the fact that the majority of milk 
production in rural areas is consumed at source (FAO, 1978c). Consequently, on the fresh milk 
market only ULB buying and selling prices are subject to price fixing and government control. 
However, effects on the domestic supply side are negligible since the plant's output is almost 
exclusively recombined milk. On the demand side, it is interesting to note that the prices for 
direct sales of fresh milk in Bamako are about 50% above the official ULB retail price for 
combined milk. This apparently reflects consumer preferences since no 'black market' for ULB 
milk exists. 
Commercial imports are subject to licensing and foreign exchange allocation, and the parastatal 
SOMIEX has a monopoly on imports of milk powder and condensed milk in cans. An average of 
26 000 t of dairy products (in LME) was imported annually from 1980 to 1982, including about 
one third as food aid. According to FAO (1983), more than half these total imports are 
consumed in Bamako. The capital's estimated milk consumption in 1984 was 20 to 25 kg LME 
per caput. In some parts of the country, especially in the northern pastoral areas, per caput milk 
consumption is substantially higher. 
The main problem is the effect of imports on consumption and production resulting from ULB 
and SOMIEX policy and price setting. The interactions between ULB and the free market, as 
well as ULB's role as a market outlet for local milk producers, are crucial for dairy development 
in the Bamako region (see also von Massow, 1984). 
Government policies can be influenced by both the agroclimatic potential and the production 
system. Government interference seems to be stronger in the 'high-potential' countries, whereas 
in the case of Mali, policies and their application are uncertain. At least in Kenya and Mali, dairy 
imports are such that special import policies are considered necessary or are already being 
pursued. 
The contribution of policy research 
The above discussion on dairy imports into sub-Saharan Africa and their policy implications has 
raised a number of issues: the impact of urbanisation on dairy and food imports; differences in 
demand for fresh vs recombined milk including their respective demand elasticities; the extent to 
which food aid substitutes or complements commercial dairy imports; and the question of how 
feasible dairy development along the lines of the 'Operation Flood' in India could be for sub-
Saharan African countries. 
All these issues should be of considerable interest to policy-makers. However, to foresee the 
impacts of any dairy import policy, there are two basic requirements: sound information must be 
available and a synchronisation of the researcher's contribution and the policy-maker's 
expectations is needed. These two conditions are obviously linked to each other. 
The information problem 
The set of statistical data that is most needed is that of domestic dairy prices. The close 
monitoring of a selected sample of markets gives an indication of the success or failure of any 
policy and enables researchers to advise on any necessary changes. The central role of prices 
in directing milk production, consumption and imports makes the improvement of price statistics 
a top priority. Dairy production data are also of great importance but are very unreliable at 
present. To improve production data is technically and organisationally more difficult than 
monitoring prices. It would help to monitor the national herds more closely and complement this 
by systematic analyses of the changes in animal productivity in some of the major production 
areas. As with prices, the survey emphasis is on continuity rather than absolute completeness 
of data. A concerted effort in these two areas would yield a high dividend and provide a 
significant step forward in policy research and formulation. 
The congruence problem 
Most economists are committed to the ideas and assumptions of the neo-classical theory. 
However, their perception of a 'welfare-enhancing' policy may be regarded as useless by policy-
makers: the economist uses an overall 'social welfare' criterion while the politician may pursue 
very different targets. The question is how to merge these sometimes conflicting attitudes. Does 
the economist have to bend to the policymaker's wishes? Or should the policy-maker defer to 
the economist? 
A first step would be to define more clearly the objectives the politician pursues and to see that 
policy research provides the decision-maker with the relative welfare costs of present or 
planned policies. To give an example, a government should be informed that while raising 
revenues of, say, US$ 50 million, an import tariff on dairy products poses a burden of US$ 200 
million on consumers' welfare while benefiting producers by only US$ 75 million, i.e. it leads to 
an overall welfare loss. The policy researchers would then have to consider the alternatives and 
describe their costs and benefits. 
The above assumes that the relationship between policy and research may well remain 
unequal. Research has to serve policy by providing information about specific policies and their 
alternatives rather than by presenting one 'optimal' solution. Thus, the inherent claim of the 
researcher to know better than the politician what might be good for the country or not, is 
excluded. 
This paper, in conclusion, argues that some dairy import policies in sub-Saharan African 
countries may have to be changed. Policy researchers will have to provide the basic information 
for policy-makers to make decisions according to their objectives. Both sides should take this as 
a challenge for cooperation. 
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List of abbreviations 
AP animal protein 
a.s.l. above sea level 
EC European Communities 
cal calorie 
CEC Commission of the European Communities (Brussels) 
c.i.f. Import price that includes the cost of insurance and freight 
DM dry matter 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Geneva 
GE gross energy 
GNP gross national product 
IDA International Development Association 
IMF International Monetary Fund (Washington D.C.) 
LME liquid milk equivalent 
LW Liveweight 
mb millibar 
MJ megajoule 
sec second 
SOMIEX  Société malienne d'importations et d'exportations  
t  metric tonne 
ULB Union laitière de Bamako 
WFP World Food Programme (Rome) 
yr year 
 
 
 
